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FOREWORD: CAN JUSTICE AND THE RULE
OF LAW BE RECONCILED?
RANDY E. BARNETT*
I. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW
Much of the current debate between activists on "the left"
and "the right" concerning the legal system can be conceived
in purely jurisprudential, as opposed to political, terms. Today,
many on the left insist that the decisions made by the legal sys-
tem conform as closely as possible to some substantive concep-
tion of "justice" that is independent of the legal system itself.
They call those who disagree "formalists." Many on the right
insist that the procedural values of the "rule of law"-general
rule-making, impartially administered among persons and over
time-preempt concern for correct outcomes. They call those
who disagree "result-oriented."
In pursuit of their preferred values, many of these conserva-
tives and liberals are willing to allow a degree of slippage in the
other less favored value. Jerome Frank, for example, rejected
the rule of law values of generality and uniformity in legal
precepts in favor of justice:
Once trapped by the belief that the announced rules are
the paramount thing in the law, and that uniformity and cer-
tainty are of major importance, and are to be procured by
uniformity and certainty in the phrasing of rules, a judge is
likely to be affected, in determining what is fair to the parties
in the unique situation before him, by consideration of the
possible, yet scarcely imaginable, bad effect of ajust opinion
in the instant case on possible unlike cases which may later
be brought into court. He then refuses to do justice in the
case on trial because he fears that "hard cases make bad
laws." And thus arises what may aptly be called "injustice
according to law."
Such injustice is particularly tragic because it is based on a
hope doomed to futility, a hope of controlling the future ....
For it is the nature of the future that it never arrives ....
The judge, at his best, is an arbitrator, a "sound man" who
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strives to do justice to the parties by exercising a wise discre-
tion with reference to the peculiar circumstances of the case.
He does not merely "find" or invent some generalized rule
which he "applies" to the facts presented to him. He does
"equity" in the sense in which Aristotle-when thinking
most clearly-described it.1
According to this view, the formal requirements of the rule
of law are either redundant or pernicious. Where justice in the
particular case and the tenets of the rule of law correspond, the
rule of law is redundant. Where justice in the particular case
and the rule of law diverge, the rule of law is pernicious to the
extent that it detracts from achieving justice.
On the other side we have scholars such as Robert Bork who
favor the rule of law over justice because:
There is no principled way to decide that one man's grati-
fications are more deserving of respect than another's or that
one form of gratification is more worthy than another....
There is no way of deciding these matters other than by ref-
erence to some system of moral or ethical values that has no
objective or intrinsic validity of its own and about which men
can and do differ.... The issue of the community's moral
and ethical values, the issue of degree of pain an activity
causes, are matters concluded by the passage and enforce-
ment of the laws in question. The judiciary has no role to
play other than that of applying the statutes in a fair and im-
partial manner. 2
According to this view, there is no "objective" category of
justice to which judges may appeal. Because justice is not neu-
tral, there are no "neutral principles" by which judges may
conclude that one result is more just than another. Lacking the
authority of neutral principles, judges must defer to the legisla-
tive will, and conform to the procedural constraints of the rule
of law.
The tension between justice and the rule of law should come
as no surprise. Conceived substantively, justice speaks to the
"correctness" of the outcome of individual cases. Conceived
procedurally, the rule of law speaks to the form of a "fair" legal
process. Conflict between these two values arises when the out-
come of a "fair" legal system is deemed to be unjust; or when
the effort by the legal system to be "just" is deemed by critics
1. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 165-66, 168 (1963) (italics in original).
Frank describes Aristotle's separation of law and equity as "unfortunate." Id. at 169 n.
2. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 10 (1971).
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to be unfair. Such a conflict is inevitable because these con-
cepts are not identical. When applied to particular cases or
controversies, concepts that are different must sometimes point
in different directions.
Notwithstanding the unavoidable tension between these con-
cepts, the interminable nature of the debate stems from the
tendency of each side to see its favored value as (in some sense)
an "end" to which the other value must remain subservient.
Both sides fail to see that, although both justice and the rule of
law are "ends" for certain analytic purposes, both are also
"means" of dealing with a set of fundamental and pervasive so-
cial problems. Today's activists on the left fail to see the essen-
tial role that the rule of law plays in solving these problems,
while today's activists on the right do not recognize why these
problems make certain principles of justice necessary.
Although I shall not accomplish a final reconciliation of these
two values in this essay,3 I will explain how, in practice, the
conflict between justice and the rule of law may be resolved by
determining a specific content of each value that addresses
these more fundamental social problems.
II. THE SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE,
INTEREST, AND POWER
The concepts ofjustice and the rule of law presuppose a so-
cial context.4 Unless and until persons interact with each other,
such ideas or practices are inapplicable. A human being may be
a "social animal" who needs the company of others to be truly
happy, but when such company is sought certain social
problems invariably arise. Justice and the rule of law may be
conceived as solutions to particular fundamental social
problems that are unavoidable features of human social life.
It is almost a truism that the possibility of social conflict be-
tween persons gives rise to a need for justice and the rule of
law. It is less commonly acknowledged that certain identifiable
features of social life in our world shape the nature of this con-
3. The thesis presented in this Foreword is part of a larger research project in pro-
gress and should be considered as tentative.
4. See Barnett, .4 Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 294-95 (1986)
(discussing allocative and distributional functions of individual entitlements) [hereinaf-
ter Consent Theory]; Barnett, Pursuing Justice in a Free Society: Part One-Power vs. Liberty,
CRIM. JUST. ETHics, Summer/Fall 1985, at 50 (discussing sources and proper content
of entitlements theory) [hereinafter Pursuing Justice].
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flict and limit the range of possible solutions to it. Any effort to
resolve or reduce social conflict and to promote social harmony
must confront the social problems of knowledge, interest, and
power.
A. The Problem of Knowledge
Let us begin by assuming what we know is untrue: that all
persons sincerely desire to be good to one another. (Pessimists
fear not, for we shall relax this assumption in the next section.)
Even if all persons were "good" in this way, there would still be
an important social role for both justice and the rule of law. In
a world of scarce resources, 5 even persons with benign inten-
tions may inadvertently harm another or interfere with an-
other's plans. The intention that one's actions be good for
others is insufficient to achieve this end. One must somehow
know what actions are truly good for others.
Suppose, for example, that Ann cultivates some land for
crops. While Ann is away foraging for food, Ben comes along
and discovers the clearing that Ann has made. Seeing no one
around, Ben begins to build a shelter in the clearing. Ann re-
turns, informs Ben of her prior activities, and asks him to leave.
Ben refuses. In the absence of a voluntary compromise, how is
this conflict to be resolved? Does Ann or Ben have the superior
claim to the clearing, or is the correct outcome that they must
somehow share? Whatever the proper resolution of this dis-
pute may be, unless Ben and Ann have some way of knowing
whose claim is stronger, or that they must share, Ben and Ann
do not know which of them must yield to the other.
Nor is this situation limited to "state of nature" scenarios.
Precisely the same problem arises if, while Ann is away work-
ing, Ben enters the apartment in which Ann has been living and
begins to fix himself some dinner with the food he finds in the
refrigerator. Who has the stronger claim to this apartment or
must they share? Or suppose that Ben wishes to have sexual
relations with Ann, but Ann refuses. Who has the stronger
claim to Ann's body or must they "share" (whatever this may
5. "Scarce resources" here refers only to the possibility that two persons may wish to
use the same resource at the same time. According to this definition, no amount of
material abundance can eliminate the scarcity of resources, so long as one person may
wish, for example, to have sexual relations with another who does not share the desire.
In this sense, "scarcity" arises because human desires for resource use are not naturally
coordinated, and not solely from the physical limits of resources.
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mean)? So strong are our moral intuitions about this last situa-
tion that it is difficult even to state the problem in ways that do
not presuppose the validity of Ann's claim to her body.
Remember we are assuming that Ann and Ben have only the
best of intentions; neither wants to harm the other. The prob-
lem is that neither knows what constitutes harm to one rather
than harm to the other unless there is some baseline allocation
of resources from which they may make such an assessment.
Without this baseline, Ann and Ben cannot know that it is Ben
and not Ann who must vacate the clearing or the apartment.
Put another way, assuming that both Ann and Ben desire only
to pursue their goals without harming anyone else, both need
somehow to know the domain in which they may act. There is a
"knowledge problem."
The knowledge problem in this context concerns two types
of subsidiary questions. The first is substantive: What is the
proper allocation of resources that are subject to potentially
conflicting use and what are the appropriate uses to which al-
lotted resources may be put? The second is methodological:
How should the decision be made and who should make it? My
purpose is not to answer these questions here, but only to sug-
gest that justice and the rule of law have evolved as answers to
these questions. Justice concerns the "proper" allocation of re-
sources. The rule of law concerns the "method" by which this
allocation is made and the decision conveyed. Justice addresses
the substantively correct answer to the question of allocation.
The rule of law addresses the proper manner by which such an
answer is determined, promulgated, and enforced.6
One may argue that there is no substantively correct or
"just" outcome that is independent of a legal decision; that
prior to an official determination there are only different pref-
erences for allocation. Ann prefers to have the clearing or
apartment; so does Ben. Ann does not wish to have sexual rela-
tions with Ben; Ben desires such relations. There is, the argu-
ment goes, no principled way to prefer one of these claims to
the other in the absence of an official ruling.
Alternatively, one may argue that while there may be a cor-
rect or just outcome in principle, there is no way to know what
it is independent of an authoritative decision of a fair legal pro-
6. This corresponds to Lon Fuller's distinction between the "external" and "inter-
nal" moralities of law. See L. FULLER, THE MORALrry OF LAw 96-97 (1969).
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cess. Whether or not Ann has an antecedent "right" to the
clearing, the apartment, or her body, it is not a "real" right
until a legal system acknowledges it. According to either argu-
ment, then, the "just" outcome would be whatever outcome is
reached by a "fair" process; there is no independent basis for
challenging the validity of whatever decision a "fair" procedure
reaches.
How plausible are such arguments? Are we really unable to
give any reasons why certain allocations are not truly better or
more just than others? Suppose a seemingly fair process deter-
mined that Ben should get the clearing simply because he was a
male and Ann a female. Are there any compelling reasons that
support the justice of such a decision? Are there no compelling
reasons to be given against the justice of such a decision? On
the contrary, such a proposition may so lack for rational sup-
port, or some objections to it that are rooted injustice may be
so compelling, that we would question the fairness of any sys-
tem that disagreed.
Suppose that a "fair" coin flip is used to decide the issue-so
that despite Ann's previous work to clear the field, Ben may get
rightful possession by winning the flip. Suppose that Ann may
refuse Ben's sexual advances only if she wins a "fair" flip. It can
only be a substantive judgment of the injustice of the results
that would undermine the fairness of this procedure. What is
fair, then, may very well depend in part on what we have reason
to think is just. Determining fair procedures may sometimes be
impossible without a peek at what is just.
1. The Epistemic Function of the Rule of Law
Does this mean that a decision is "fair" solely because it con-
forms to what we believe to be just? No, for there is an impor-
tant sense in which the rule of law is operationally independent
of a substantively "correct" outcome.
We have already assumed that Ann and Ben desire to know
what they may rightly do and they will do it. Deprived of such
knowledge each may act in good faith and still "unjustly" harm
the other. Now let us assume that a perfect theory of just allo-
cation is already in existence but it is entirely unknown to both
Ann and Ben. Lacking knowledge of this perfect theory ofjus-
tice, they are still likely to harm one another inadvertently.
There are two promising ways of responding to this instance
602 [Vol. 11
Foreword
of the knowledge problem. First, suppose that the theory of
justice is based on some natural feature or features of the situa-
tion-first possession, for example. Based on our common
knowledge of what motivates possession, the mere fact of first
possession may be presumed to be for the purpose of beneficial
use by the possessor who is first. Moreover, investment in life-
enhancing improvements requires reliance on continued bene-
ficial use over time. In this situation, beneficial use and expec-
tations based on prior investment may best be protected by
applying a precept of "first in time, first in right."
If such is the case and the natural feature on which the pre-
cept rests is "prominent"7 enough, both Ann and Ben may be
able to reach the correct result simply by reflecting upon the
situation. This does not necessarily mean, however, that Ann
and Ben will explicitly formulate the precept itself.
Man certainly does not know all the rules which guide his
actions in the sense that he is able to state them in words....
Although man never existed without laws that he obeyed, he
did, of course, exist for hundreds of thousands of years with-
out laws he "knew" in the sense that he was able to articulate
them.8
Perhaps if our intuitions favor Ann's claim over Ben's, it is
because our intuitions reflect this "common sense" of the situ-
ation. When a dispute arises and a third party is called in to
judge the merits of the claim, the precept that is articulated
may simply render explicit this tacit or inchoate knowledge.
Once articulated, others may be able to reach the correct deci-
sion more reliably and quickly if they (or their advisors) are
aware of the precept that best captures the common sense of
this situation.
If the first method of deciding disputes corresponds to what
Aquinas called rational "conclusion" from principle, other con-
flicts require what he called a "determination" 9 consistent with
7. The important role that natural prominence or obviousness plays in the formation
of legal norms is discussed in R. SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGrrs, CO-OPERATION
AND WELFARE 44-52 (1986) [hereinafter ECONOMICS OF RIGsrrs]. Professor Sugden dis-
cusses a very similar example in Sugden, Labour, Property and the Morality of Markets, in
THE MARKET IN HISTORY 23-28 (B. Anderson & A. Latham eds. 1986).
8. 1 F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 43 (1973).
9. As Aquinas explains:
Some things are... derived from the common principles of the natural law
by way of conclusions: for instance, that one must not kill may be derived as a
conclusion from the principle that one should do harm to no man. But some
No. 3] 603
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principle, or what we may today call convention.' For exam-
ple, although there may be no reason whatsoever to prefer that
traffic flow on one side of the road rather than the other, there
is good reason to "determine" that traffic shall flow on one of
the two sides. It matters not which of two alternatives is chosen,
so long as one is chosen. Once chosen, such a convention will
decide a dispute. If such is the case, Ann and Ben need some
way to learn the relevant convention.
Whether derived from rational principle or convention or
some combination of the two, then, both Ann and Ben still
need some way of knowing what the just outcome is in a partic-
ular dispute. Assuming good intentions, they may sometimes
learn the just outcome on their own by reflecting on the situa-
tion and responding to some prominent feature of it. When
they cannot generate their own solution, conflict can be
avoided only if others somehow inform them of the just out-
come. Moreover, when one of them relies on a social conven-
tion, the other must already know of it or be able to
substantiate its existence. In short, justice is not purely instinc-
tive. Even a perfect theory of justice will sometimes require an
effective mechanism of communication.
Furthermore, the timing of this communication is crucial.
Communication can take place either before a conflict arises (ex
ante) or after a conflict arises (ex post). There are advantages to
each approach. Only ex post may we learn the actual facts of a
particular dispute and base our judgment upon them. Ex ante
we are able only to know in general terms the kinds of disputes
that may arise. Presumably, an ex post decision can be much
more exactly tailored to fit what actually occurred than an ex
ante decision. Only ex post, arguably, can we know exactly why
and how much Ann and Ben desire to control the clearing, the
apartment, or Ann's body.
are derived from these principles by way of determination: for instance, the
law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished, but that he be pun-
- ished in this or that way is a determination of the law of nature.
Accordingly, both modes of derivation are found in human law. But those
things which are derived in the first way are contained in human law not as
emanating from it exclusively, but have some force from the natural law also.
But those things which are derived in the second way have no other force than
that of human law.
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, in 20 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 228 (1980).
10. For a discussion of the spontaneous development and stability of certain conven-
tions, see ECONOMICS OF RIGHTs, supra note 7.
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There is however a serious drawback to particularistic ex post
decisionmaking. A purely ex post system unavoidably requires
that a dispute first occur. This means that ex post decisionmak-
ing actually requires the disruption of social life and that scarce
resources be spent on an ex post adjudicative process. Without a
real dispute, one cannot know the particular facts on which to
base an ex post judgment. Without an ex post adjudicative pro-
cess, no authoritative judgments are possible. In principle,
then, an ex post approach is incapable of avoiding or preventing
costly social disruption. While some may argue that parties
could learn future decisions from very detailed accounts of the
factual bases of past ex post judgments, such an argument con-
cedes the desireability of ex ante judgment and rejects a pure ex
post approach.
Despite the social disruption it causes, an ex post approach
might be acceptable if a legal system were ever completely able
to undo costlessly the wrong expost-to turn back the clock and
adjust the situation. In our world, however, this is quite impos-
sible. When a dispute takes place costs that can never be fully
compensated, such as the costs of adjudication itself, must be
born by both disputing parties. The subjective costs of any ac-
tion are borne by the actor in the form of opportunities for
alternative conduct that can never be recaptured.'" Whoever
loses this or any dispute ex post can never arrange his or her
affairs so as to avoid the conflict. If Ann loses, she can never
use her expended time and energies to clear a different piece of
land. If Ben loses, he can never use his expended time and en-
ergies to build another shelter on land that is truly his. Once
her body is violated, Ann can never be returned to an ex ante
position. She can never be "unraped."
Moreover, even an ex post analysis is not infallible. A legal
system faces its own knowledge problem. For many reasons, it
is extremely difficult for ex post fact-finders to put themselves in
the shoes of the parties to a dispute. Adjudicative errors are
inevitable. The costs of such errors are magnified when they
occur after it is too late to avoid the conflict. Perhaps a decision
that the clearing belongs to Ann is unjust. The injustice is mag-
nified, however, if the decision comes after rather than before
Ben has built a shelter on the land. Even if Ann keeps the shel-
l 1. See J. BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE 1-26 (1969) (distinguishing objective and
subjective concepts of cost).
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ter and compensates Ben for his loss ex post, it means that the
time it takes her to produce the compensation may not be used
in the manner she would have preferred had Ben not built the
shelter in the first place. Do we really want to wait until after
the fact to adjudicate the justice of Ben's claim to Ann's body?
If not, then perhaps this is due to our ex ante convictions con-
cerning the justice of Ben's claim, the costs to Ann of waiting,
and, to a much lesser extent, the risk of an adjudicative error in
Ben's favor.
In sum, whatever an ex post system may gain by its ability to
render more particularistic judgments is jeopardized by its in-
ability to avoid losses being inflicted on the guilty and innocent
alike. Therefore it would be preferable that such information
be communicated ex ante. For, assuming that ex ante knowledge
of justice is possible, it is clearly preferable that a conflict be
avoided altogether, so neither Ann's nor Ben's life is disrupted
at all. When the full costs to the parties of ex post adjudication is
taken into account, the application of an ex ante precept need
not be perfect to be preferable.
It is no accident, then, that a standard feature of the rule of
law is communication before the fact. Without advance com-
munication, vital information about justice is not conveyed to
persons who may inadvertently come into conflict with one an-
other. Prospective communication is not merely a part of a for-
mal definition of law. Nor is it solely a product of the belief that
it is "unfair" to hold persons to a rule of conduct that was un-
known to them. Prospective communication is a practical ne-
cessity if costly disputes-and resultant injustices-are to be
avoided by those who wish only to know how.
To effectively achieve prospective communication, law must
take a certain form. Lon Fuller listed eight requirements of le-
gality 2 : generality, promulgation, prospectivity, clarity, consis-
tency, requirements that are possible to obey, constancy
through time, and congruence between official action and de-
clared rule. These features serve "the enterprise of subjecting
human conduct to the governance of rules. Unlike most mod-
em theories of law, this view treats law as an activity and re-
gards a legal system as the product of a sustained purposive
effort."'
12. L. FULLER, supra note 6, at 33-94.
13. Id. at 106.
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The purpose or function 4 of this lawmaking effort is the
conveyance of vital information to members of a society. Each
of these features of the "rule of law" can be understood as en-
abling the communication of useful information about "jus-
tice" in advance of conflicts and thereby making possible the
avoidance of interpersonal conflict. The absence of any of these
features impedes, sometimes completely, the ability to convey
the relevant information.
A total failure in any one of these eight directions does not
simply result in a bad system of law; it results in something
that is not properly called a legal system at all, except per-
haps in the Pickwickian sense in which a void contract can
still be said to be one kind of contract. 5
This claim is not a matter of semantics, 6 but of function.
The analysis thus far may be summarized as follows: Without
ex ante knowledge of substantive justice, even good people will
inadvertently harm one another unjustly. Knowledge of justice
that cannot be obtained by personal intuition and reason must
be obtained from communication with others. To be under-
standable ex ante this communication must take certain recog-
nizable forms that are associated with the rule of law. Without
the formal characteristics of the rule of law, justice will be un-
knowable in advance of personal decisions to act and, conse-
quently, avoidable injustices will unavoidably occur.
Some have questioned whether it really is possible to convey
such ex ante knowledge. Some legal realists argued that it is sim-
ply impossible to convey sufficiently accurate knowledge about
just conduct in advance of a dispute. They alleged that any ef-
fort to convey information by general rules and principles 7 is
14. F.A. Hayek argues that using the term "purpose" to describe a spontaneously
evolved order is potentially misleading. It suggests that a human maker had a particular
purpose in mind in creating and maintaining the order, whereas a spontaneous order is
not deliberately made or preserved and therefore "cannot legitimately be said to have a
particular purpose, although our awareness of its existence may be extremely impor-
tant for our successful pursuit of a great variety of different purposes." F. HAYEK, supra
note 8, at 38 (emphasis in original). For this reason he suggests that "it is preferable to
avoid in this connection the term 'purpose' and to speak instead of 'function.' " Id. at
39. Law can be said to have an essential social function even if no one is aware of it.
15. L. FULLER, supra note 6, at 39.
16. For a criticism of "semantic" legal philosophies, see R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
31-46 (1986).
17. I have described law as "three-dimensional," embracing the dimensions of the-
ory (rationale), doctrine (rules and principles), and practice (application of doctrine to
facts). See Barnett, Foreword: Why We Need Legal Philosophy, 8 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 9-
10 (1985). Rather than continually repeat the phrase "legal rules and principles," in
Foreword 607No. 3]
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futile, either because abstract precepts would fail to reflect the
justice of particular situations, or because these precepts are
too indeterminate for judges, much less individual citizens, to
follow. Moreover, they argue, citizens-even commercial ac-
tors-are pervasively ignorant of what legal precepts have to
say.
In recent years there have been potent responses to the last
two of these accusations. I shall only list a few. First, the fact
that legal precepts are sometimes indeterminate does not mean
that they are always or even mostly indeterminate.1 8 For every
hard case there are a vast multitude of easy cases.' 9 For every
easy case there are a vast multitude of transactions that never
become cases at all. The indeterminacy thesis is based on a mis-
leading sample of disputes. Second, even hard cases may have
right answers and, as we saw with the example of Ann and Ben,
such answers may be present and available at the time of the
dispute.20 Third, while many persons may be ignorant of the
law, this may not matter if there is a common sense of the mat-
ter and the law accurately reflects it. 2 ' Fourth, ignorance of the
law does not provide an ex post excuse provided knowledge of
the law is possible ex ante.22 Finally, repeat players in the legal
sytem usually know the rules and usually deal with other repeat
players. Novices may obtain such knowledge from lawyers. In-
deed this analysis explains the vital role that lawyers play as
private disseminators of information. When the risk of a dis-
pute is too small to make this investment likely and when the
rules do not conform to common sense, repeat players should
be compelled to make the operative rule explicit in their
this Foreword, I am employing the term "legal precepts" to embrace both kinds of
doctrine.
18. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-50 (1961) (criticizing "rule-
skepticism" of the legal realists); Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical
Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987) (criticizing the "indeterminacy thesis as it has
been developed in critical legal scholarship").
19. See Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203 (1985) (describing
the prevalence of "easy cases").
20. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIousLY 81-130 (1977) (defending the
thesis that even "hard cases" have right answers); R. DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE
119-45 (1985) (same).
21. See, e.g., F. HAYEK, supra note 8, at 43: "[The rules which govern the actions of
elements of such spontaneous orders need not be rules which are "known" to these
elements; it is sufficient that the elements actually behave in a manner which can be
described by such rules."
22. See Consent Theory, supra note 4, at 300-09 (justifying the "objective" interpreta-
tion of rights).
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What about the claim that ex ante rules and principles are in-
herently unjust because they cannot capture all the details of
actual disputes? Part of the answer to this objection has already
been suggested. Although ex ante precepts may be far from per-
fect in avoiding and resolving conflicts, ex post justice actually
requires that conflicts occur-conflicts that will be incurably
unjust to at least one and possibly both of the parties. Because
only some effort at ex ante justice stands even a chance of avoid-
ing this injustice, the injustice avoided by ex post adjudication is
likely to be dwarfed by the injustice avoided by good ex ante
precepts.
24
Another part of the response to this claim rests on the episte-
mic function of justice itself.
2. The Epistemic Function ofJustice
To this point we have assumed that a perfect theory of sub-
stantivejustice existed, and this theory needed to be communi-
cated for it to be known and observed. Even if a perfect theory
were possible, however, we do not possess it. How, then, do we
go about determining what is a "just" allocation of resources?
Not surprisingly, perhaps, it turns out that the knowledge
problem plays an important role here as well.
Ann and Ben need to know how to resolve their conflict,
preferably before they invest time and energy improving re-
sources that they must later divest. This is why waiting for a
conflict to develop and then taking it before an adjudicator
would be wasteful. Precepts by which the "just" outcome may
be determined should be promulgated in advance.
Not all precepts are equally informative, however. 25 Sup-
23. See, e.g., Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 179,
200-01 (1986) (firms who wish to avoid specific relief should have to make this an ex-
plicit term of any contract .with a consumer).
24. Of course, where an ex ante formulation of a precept proves to be unsatisfactory,
it can be modified ex post provided we are willing to apply the modified rule in the
future. The effort to reform ex ante precepts in particular cases creates an engine of
change that accounts for the knowledge embedded in an evolved tradition. See infra text
accompanying notes 42-43. Moreover, the traditional separation of law and equity per-
mitted ex post adjustments in certain cases where an es ante precept was generally satis-
factory, but its failure in a particular dispute was extreme. This approach was practical
so long as the division of law and equity was maintained and equitable "exceptions"
could be distinguished from "the rule." Finally, even a completely satisfactory legal
precept is only presumptively binding. See infra note 31.
25. Cf. F. HAYEK, supra note 8, at 43-44:
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pose, for example, that the promulgated precept is: "The one
who needs the land the most gets it." Assume that both Ann
and Ben are aware of this precept in advance of any dispute
between them. Ben comes across the clearing. Can he know
that it is safe to erect a shelter upon it? How can he know that
he needs it more than Ann? When Ann returns, how can she
know whether to vacate or remain? The problem of knowledge
created by this precept is compounded when third parties such
as judges attempt to answer such a question. The same difficul-
ties exist with a precept that: "The person who places the high-
est value on the land gets it." How is any potential claimant to
know who values the land the most?26 With either proposition,
the knowledge problem stems not from the form of the rele-
vant precept but from its substance.
Suppose instead that the rule is simply, "first in time, first in
right."' 27 Both Ann and Ben are aware of this precept when Ben
happens across the clearing. Can he know that it is safe to erect
a shelter upon it? How is he to know whether he is the first one
to the clearing? When Ann returns, how does Ben know that
Ann is not the second in time? The rule is inadequate because
it does not specify some mode of communicating "first in
time." It would be improved if it required that a cleared area be
fenced, or that its boundaries be artificially marked or "staked"
by Ann, the first possessor, to establish the timing of her claim.
So the better precept would be "first to stake a recognizable
claim, first in right." 28
[Niot every regularity in the behaviour of the elements does secure an over-
all order. Some rules governing individual behavior might clearly make alto-
gether impossible the formation of an overall order. Our problem is what kind
of rules of conduct will produce an order of society and what kind of order
particular rules will produce.
26. Cf Consent Theory, supra note 4, at 277-83 (criticizing efficiency theories of con-
tract for failing to address the knowledge problem).
27. See Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH.
U.L.Q. 667, 669-74 (1986) (discussing the rule that "Prior in Time is Higher in
Right").
28. Time, Property Rights, and the Common Law: Round Table Discussion, 64 WASH. U.L.Q
793, 801 (1986) (statement of Richard Epstein):
The usual way in which people handled the problem of demarcation is that,
instead of having a rule of naked first possession, they had a rule in which they
put out claim stakes at the edges that formed a visible and known barrier.
Everybody else then had notice and was able to alter his conduct accordingly.
See also Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 73, 77 (1985) ("The
clear-act principle suggests that the common law defines acts of possession as some
kind of statement. As Blackstone said, the acts must be a declaration of one's intent to
appropriate.") (citation omitted; emphasis in original); id. at 78-79 ("Possession now
begins to look even more like something that requires a kind of communication, and
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This precept offers some significant epistemic advantages
over other alternatives. It enables well-meaning claimants to
determine for themselves the comparative merits of their
claims, and it makes it easier for third parties to assess the mer-
its of claims.29 This suggests that both the form and the sub-
stance ofjustice are influenced by the problem of knowledge in
society.
This or any other isolated precept is undoubtedly incom-
plete. For example, in a particular case the knowledge problem
would be solved (both ex ante and ex post) if it could be shown
that Ben had actually observed Ann clearing the field, even
though she had failed to stake her claim.30 In a well-conceived
system of law, there is no legal precept that does not poten-
tially admit of certain exceptions. More accurately, all precepts
are only presumptively binding.3 1 Still, if it can be justified as
presumptively binding, the precept, "first to stake a recogniza-
ble claim, first in right," does not require that every adjudicator
consider expost the substantive justice of first possession in par-
ticular cases. By informing potential claimants and adjudicators
alike of the relative merits of claims ex ante, the precept helps to
avoid disputes and permits justice to be done in most cases.
Notice, however, that the justice of this suggested precept or
even a complete set of such presumptively binding precepts is
the original claim to the property looks like a kind of speech, with the audience com-
posed of all others who might be interested in claiming the object in question.").
29. This example is replicated in every department of private law theory. In contract
law, for example, we require a manifestation or communication of assent. See Consent
Theory, supra note 4, at 300-07 (describing and defending the objective approach to
contractual interpretation). In agency law we have a doctrine of "apparent" agency.
See Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency With Contract Theory, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1969,
1944-97 (1987).
30. So too in contract law, we protect a party's reliance upon the objective appear-
ances. When the parties shared a common subjective understanding of a term, how-
ever, it will generally be enforced even when it differs from the objective meaning. Id.
at 307-09.
31. A precept is presumptively or prima fade binding because it captures the right
outcome for the majority of cases within its reach, but it may be rebutted by showing
additional and exceptional facts that normally undermine the correctness of the prima
fade case. This response or "defense" to the primafacie case is itself only presumptively
or primafacie compelling and may be rebutted by other still more exceptional facts. The
law governing a particular dispute consists of a series of such presumptions at a succes-
sion of stages, each of which captures the majority of cases at a particular stage of
analysis. As the analysis progresses the number of unresolved cases is steadily reduced.
See, e.g., Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. CHl. L. REv. 556 (1973) (discussing
the appropriate role of presumptions and staged pleadings in legal analysis); Consent
Theory, supra note 4, at 309-10 (discussing the presumptive nature of consent in con-
tract theory).
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not self-evident or self-explanatory. Such precepts may strike
some as an arbitrary or purely "formal" way of assigning of
rights adopted strictly for administrative convenience, rather
than from a concern for justice. To fully appreciate the justice
of the precept, "first to stake a recognizable claim, first in
right," requires an examination of the reasons why anyone ap-
propriates resources to their own use, the reasons why reliance
on such claims is beneficial to the claimant and to the common
good, the reasons why the claims of first possessors as a rule
are superior to those who come later. In short, such a precept
requires moral justification.
This suggests that the justice of a particular precept or set of
precepts depends on more than the fact that a particular pre-
cept or set of precepts may be applied and known in advance of
a dispute. It requires as well a consideration of what Lon Fuller
called the "external" morality of law.3 2 Although justice ex-
tends beyond the concern for formal legality, this enhanced
moral analysis also has an important epistemic dimension. For
the justification of the substance of certain legal rules also de-
pends on the type of "local" knowledge about personal and
group plans and goals that only individuals and groups pos-
sess. Once initially allocated, the discretion of individuals to re-
allocate resources stems, at least in part, from where the
knowledge of how resources may best be used resides.3 3
Individuals and their close associates are generally in the
best position to know what they need and desire and what is
required to achieve it. For example, should Ann and Ben both
decide to have sexual relations with each other, they are in a far
better position than a third party to know that this will make
them happy. They may err, of course, but given that they are
the most likely to know what makes them happy and that they
bear the subjective costs of choice, it is their mistake to make.
The practical alternative to individual discretion is not a correct
choice made by third parties, but a different and far more egre-
gious set of mistakes.
32. L. FULLER, supra note 6, at 96.
33. The seminal modem work on this aspect of the knowledge problem is F. HAYEK,
The Use of Knowledge in Society, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 137-42 (1951).
Professor Hayek's role in explaining the epistemological functions of market institu-
tions and processes is described inJ. GRAY, HAYEK ON LIBERTY 40 (1984), and D. LAy.
OIE, RIVALRY AND CENTRAL PLANNING 106-66, 171-73 (1985). For a concise description
of the "knowledge problem," see D. LAVOIE, NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING: WHAT IS
LEFT? 51-92 (1985).
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Even if Ann and Ben are mistaken about their own best inter-
ests, the simple fact that they subjectively prefer a course of
conduct that may be "bad" for them affects the propriety (and
the efficacy) of a third party's forcible intervention to correct
their mistake. Successful persuasion that changes their subjec-
tive preferences yields significantly different results than suc-
cessful coercion to change their objective conduct.
Moreover, individual discretion is especially important if one
accepts Aristotle's view that happiness is not a state of being,
but an activity34 or, in the words of Henry Veatch, a "do-it-
yourselfjob."3 5 That is, the activity of choice is an indispensa-
ble element of a good life, rather than an incidental or ancillary
feature.
Of course, contemporary intuitions largely support a defer-
ential respect for the consensual choices of Ann and Ben in this
area. Had I chosen a consensual commercial exchange or the
injection of an intoxicating substance into one's body,3" the
analysis would be much the same, but the intuitions of many
would differ. The issue there is not whether the same analysis
extends to these other domains 37 but whether, at a minimum,
the problem of knowledge plausibly pertains, albeit along with
other concerns, to this domain. Regardless of what other justi-
fications exist for repecting Ann and Ben's exercise of consent,
most would admit that epistemic concerns can be seen to oper-
ate here.
The substance of justice, therefore, must also take into ac-
count the consensual action that is required for the pursuit of
survival and happiness in society with others. This consensual
activity may be in pursuit of ends that are common to the con-
senting parties or may be based on a reciprocal exchange of
34. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 20-21 (M. Ostwald trans. 1962) (dis-
tinguishing between "the possession" and "the practice of virtue, viz., as being a char-
acteristic or an activity" and favoring the latter).
35. H. VEATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS: FACT OR FANCY? 114 (1985).
36. This is an issue I discuss elsewhere. See Barnett, Curing the Drug Law Addiction: The
Harmful Side Effects of Legal Prohibition, in DEALING WITH DRUGS 73 (R. Hamowy ed.
1987).
37. Elsewhere, for example, I distinguish between the inalienable rights one has in
one's body and the alienable rights one has in external resources. See Barnett, supra
note 23. As I explain there, the consent of a rights-holder normally passes title to exter-
nal resources to another but does not convey the ownership one has in one's own body.
Whether there are other differences between the ownership of one's body and the own-
ership of external resources is a worthwhile inquiry. The value of the principle of "self-
ownership" to the discussion here is that it establishes for most the acceptability of
some domain of private ownership. The rest is line-drawing.
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resources.18 In addition to avoiding disputes by conveying
knowledge of what belongs to whom in advance, the substance
of legal precepts should harnesses the local knowledge that re-
sides in all of us by acknowledging a right to use and dispose of
what is otherwise determined to be "ours." 39
Showing how the knowledge problem is better solved by one
particular set of allocative precepts than another is not my pur-
pose here. My thesis is that while the rule of law and justice
may sometimes conflict, they are both different means of solv-
ing the vital social problem of knowledge. Their respective
contents should be significantly influenced by this function.
Conflicts that may arise between justice and the rule of law may
be fruitfully addressed by considering which of the two com-
peting concerns best ameliorates the knowledge problem.
For example, the fact that the rule of law requires prospec-
tive lawmaking sometimes clashes with justice when a particular
lawsuit reveals a prior formulation of a rule to be deficient.
Which gives way, the rule of law or justice? The fact that both
address the knowledge problem helps us to choose. Suppose a
good faith dispute exists about the justice of applying an un-
questionably relevant precept to an unanticipated set of facts.
In such a case, at least, the precept has failed to avoid a dispute
among two persons acting in good faith. At this point the re-
quirements of both justice between the parties and ex ante com-
munication to future actors may justify a new explicit exception
to the rule.4" As F.A. Hayek, an ardent proponent of the rule of
law, explains:
What has been promulgated or announced beforehand
will often be only a very imperfect formulation of principles
which people can better honour in action than express in
words. Only if one believes that all law is an expression of
the will of a legislator and has been invented by him, rather
than an expression of the principles required by the exigen-
cies of a going order, does it seem that previous announce-
38. See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 357 (1978)
("It is submitted that there are two basic forms of social ordering: organization by
common aims and organization by reciprocity.").
39. The quotation marks reflect the fact that what belongs to us cannot be based
solely on the existence of local knowledge. For example, two persons may both know
(far better than outsiders) how each would use a particular item that only one of them
may possess. Although local knowledge is not irrelevant to specifying the domain of
private ownership-it strongly supports respect for consensual exchanges, for exam-
ple--other factors must also be considered.
40. See F. HAYEK, supra note 8, at 115-18.
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ment is an indispensible condition of knowledge of the law.
Indeed it is likely that few endeavours by judges to improve
the law have come to be accepted by others unless they
found expressed in them what in a sense they "knew"
already.4 1
While of great importance, however, the problem of knowl-
edge is not the whole story.
B. The Problem of Interest
To this point we have assumed that Ann and Ben wanted to
act justly towards one another, provided that they knew what
was just. Of course, some people wish only to benefit them-
selves and are indifferent to whether their actions may harm
another. Some even gain pleasure from the very act of harming
others. This suggests that solving the knowledge problem is
not enough. Even in a world of "perfect information" about
the just allocation of resources, some would attempt to serve
their own interests by taking what they knew did not belong to
them. Some argue that legal sanctions are needed to influence
the decisions of such persons. This concern appears to animate
Holmes' "bad man" theory of law.42
H.L.A. Hart, describing this as the "external point of
view,"-4' rejected the idea that either a good man or a bad man
theory explained the whole of law.
At any given moment the life of any society which lives by
rules, legal or not, is likely to consist in a tension between
those who, on the one hand, accept and voluntarily co-oper-
ate in maintaining the rules, and so see their own and other
persons' behaviour in terms of the rules, and those who, on
the other hand, reject the rules and attend to them only from
the external point of view as a sign of possible punishment.
One of the difficulties facing any legal theory anxious to do
justice to the complexity of the facts is to remember the
presence of both these points of view and not to define one
of them out of existence.44
41. Id. at 118.
42. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897):
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge en-
ables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct,
whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.
43. H.L.A. HART, supra note 18, at 86-87. Professor Hart's distinction between the
"external" and "internal" points of view does not correspond to Fuller's distinction
between the "external" and "internal" moralities of law discussed supra note 6.
44. H.L.A. Hart, supra note 18, at 88.
No. 3] Foreword 615
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
My thesis is that each of these "points of view" reflect distin-
guishable social problems. Properly conceived, justice and the
rule of law are based on neither undue optimism, nor undue
pessimism about human nature and the human condition, but a
proper mixture of the two. Adopting Hart's distinction, the "in-
ternal" view of law should realistically address the problem of
knowledge (while "optimistically" assuming good intentions);
the "external" view of law should realistically address the prob-
lem of interest (while "optimistically" assuming knowledge of re-
quired behavior).
What is the effect of the problem of interest on a proper con-
ception of justice and the rule of law? As with the problem of
knowledge, there are many more aspects of the interest prob-
lem than can be discussed here. Still, let me suggest a few ways
that the problem of interest may supplement or alter an ap-
proach to justice and the rule of law that might otherwise satis-
factorily address the knowledge problem.
Let us return to Ann and Ben. Ann comes back to the clear-
ing and finds Ben erecting a shelter. Both know that the rule is
"first to stake a recognizable claim, first in right." Ann clearly
has staked a claim. Ben refuses to vacate because he calculates
that he will be better off taking Ann's clearing from her than
respecting her claim. How may Ann respond to Ben's unjust
act? Or suppose that, knowing full well that Ann has a right to
refuse his advances, Ben tries to force her to have sexual rela-
tions with him. How may Ann respond to Ben's attack?
A common view is that, in one or both of these situations,
Ann may use force against Ben or at least that she may prevail
upon someone else (perhaps the state) to use force on her be-
half. One reason this is a common view, I think, is because
common notions of justice attempt to address the problem of
interest. We know all too well that some will disregard what
they know to be just when it suits their interests. Some right to
use force in defense of one's rightful domain that would be un-
necessary if all people acted in good faith is quite necessary for
a system of rights to effectively maintain the individual discre-
tion these domains are supposed to provide.
To effectively address the problem of interest, however, it is
not enough that Ann is accorded a right to drive Ben off the
land or repel his advances by self-help or other means. It is
necessary that Ben know ex ante of Ann's right of self-defense
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and her ability to exercise that right. If Ben is willing to violate
the rights of others when he perceives that it is in his interest,
he must be aware of Ann's right of self-defense and her ability
to enforce this right before his calculation of self-interest is af-
fected and the conflict successfully avoided. Only if this knowl-
edge is successfully conveyed to Ben will he incorporate into
his analysis of his interest the costs he is likely to sustain as a
result of his acting unjustly. Only then will he perceive ex ante
that the costs to him exceed the benefits to be gained and re-
frain from his unjust conduct.
In ajust society, Ann's rights and her enforcement ability are
related to the extent that the help of others is more likely to be
forthcoming if others are persuaded that Ann's legitimate
rights are indeed threatened. This gives rise to a further prob-
lem of knowledge. It is not enough that Ann and Ben know
who must vacate the clearing; others must know as well. Hap-
pily, the same substantive principles and formal requirements
that address the first problem of knowledge help solve this
knowledge problem as well. For example, a principle that re-
quired a manifested claim of ownership makes the claim de-
monstrable to third parties as well as to Ben.
Still, requiring that one prove the merits of one's claim to
others may require further modifications of substantive and
formal dimensions ofjustice and the rule of law. When the re-
turn of property is sought, for example, it would seem to give
rise to the need for some form of fact-finding procedure and a
body of evidence law to ensure that parties may effectively
present "proofs and reasoned arguments" 45 in support of their
claims of right. Only when third parties have reliable means of
knowing whose claim of right is just may they confidently take
the side of the victim or refrain from defending those in the
wrong. If it is well-known that such claims are accurately de-
cided and effective assistance provided, then the ex ante interest
of potential rights violators is altered and rights violations are
thereby prevented.
Even with an effective means of assisting those whose rights
are threatened, however, it seems that it would not be enough
that ex post Ben will be effectively ousted from Ann's clearing.
Ben may be willing to run the risk that he will be ousted on the
45. Professor Fuller viewed "true" adjudication as providing this mode of participa-
tion to parties to a dispute. See Fuller, supra note 38, at 363-72.
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chance that his effort will succeed. Some additional sanction for
his conduct would be needed to cause him to sufficiently dis-
count the probability that his aggression will succeed. In short,
the problem of interest explains not only the forcible defense
of self and others, but also the forcible exaction of sanctions for
successfully breaching a legal precept.
At least part of this requirement may already be implicitly
addressed by the precepts that address the knowledge prob-
lem. If one has a "property interest" in certain resources, for
example, one may reclaim them if they are wrongfully taken.
When reclaiming the resources is not feasible or desirable,
monetary compensation is a very short step from the right to
the resources themselves.46
It is commonly thought that the problem of interest must be
addressed by the imposition of legal penalties over and above
those that would serve to compensate the victim of injustice
completely. Just as a legal sanction may be needed to affect the
interests of those who would take a chance on overcoming self-
defense, many would argue that enhanced sanctions are
needed to compensate for the chance that a rights-violator will
not be caught or successfully prosecuted. Without enhanced
penalties, the "bad man's" calculation of interest will inade-
quately deter him from unjust conduct even if he has to make
complete restitution.47
It is here, however, that we begin to glimpse the limits of the
ability of law to successfully address the problem of interest.
While the rule of law employs general rules and principles and
other formal requirements to address the problem of knowl-
edge, law must employ force or power to address the problem
of interest. Yet the strategy of using force or power gives rise to
its own distinct set of problems that at some point produce di-
minishing returns. This problem of power in turn accounts for
a proper conception ofjustice and the rule of law that limits in
some manner the availability of force to punish unjust conduct.
46. I discuss a "restitutive theory ofjustice" in Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm of
Criminal Justice, 87 ETmics 279 (1977); Barnett, The Justice of Restitution, 25 AM. J. JuRIs.
117 (1980); and Pursuing justice, supra note 4, at 63-67.
47. It should be noted that even if enhanced sanctions to compensate for the
probability of a rights-violator escaping any sanction is desirable, this does not neces-
sarily entail a shift in the form of relief away from compensation to victims.
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C. The Problem of Power
1. Power and the Knowledge Problem
Any attempt to solve the problem of interest by increasing
the severity of forcible sanctions gives rise to its own knowl-
edge problems. 48 The problem of interest presupposes that ex
ante knowledge of the rules is not enough to deter the "bad
man." The ex ante threat of ex post penalties must be such as to
deprive the "bad man" of any potential subjective gains from
violating rights. The intractable problems facing such an effort
are commonly overlooked.
First, there is no reliable way to know how to tailor an ex post
sanction so that no one will perceive a potential gain from ag-
gression. Different persons will subjectively discount their fu-
ture costs and benefits at radically different rates and those who
are most likely to commit unjust acts are precisely those whose
internal rates of discount are the highest.49 Because we lack
knowledge of individual subjective discount rates, we are un-
able to tailor penalties that effectively take account of the vary-
ing weight different persons place on future consequences in
deciding on present conduct.
Second, at some point pursuing justice by a strategy of in-
creasing all legal sanctions to address the problem of interest
will be self-defeating. The justice of any legal sanction depends
upon the existence of certain facts that show the commission of
an unjust act, but no fact-finding mechanism is error free. As
the costs of sanctions are raised, the costs of erroneously im-
posing sanctions is raised as well. Beyond a certain level of
sanctions we will be doing more injustice than justice.
2. Power and the Problem of Interest
A strategy of increasing the severity of forcible sanctions to
48. While this section describes problems of power that would exist regardless of
the structure of law enforcement, where law enforcement is entrusted to monopoly
institutions, special problems arise that I describe elsewhere. See Pursuing Justice, supra
note 4, at 50-56 (describing the practical and moral problems with the "power princi-
ple"); Barnett, Pursuing Justice in a Free Society: Part Two-Crime Prevention and the Legal
Order, 5 CRIM. JUST. ETHics 30 (1986) (comparing monopolistic with competitive legal
institutions) [hereinafter Crime Prevention].
49. See Banfield, Present-Orientedness and Crime, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTrru-
TION, RETRIBUTION AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 133 (R. Barnett &J. Hagel III eds. 1977).
See also O'Driscoll, Professor Banfield on Time Horizon: What has He Taught Us About Crime?,
id. at 143; Rizzo, Time Preference, Situational Determinism, and Crime, id. at 163.
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address the problem of interest also creates two potent
problems of interest of its own. First, the object of increasing
the severity of sanctions is to raise the ex ante costs of engaging
in unjust conduct. But the ex ante costs of unjust consequences
depends not only on the severity of ex post sanctions, but also
on the ex ante probability or certainty of their ex post imposition.
Consequently, declining to act unjustly is not the only rational
response to a threatened increase in severity. One may also re-
duce one's ex ante costs by reducing the likelihood of receiving a
legal sanction.
For example, one may increase resistance to the imposition
of sanctions ex post. We can expect that as the level of
threatened sanctions increases, the willingness of those who
are the object of sanctions to invest resources to resist the im-
position of sanctions can be expected to rise as well. As invest-
ment in resistance increases, the rate of successful sanctioning
will decline, adversely affecting the ex ante probability of receiv-
ing a sanction.
Contrary to the implicit assumptions of much academic dis-
cussion of this topic, whatever the theoretical relationship is
between severity and certainty of sanctions, in practice they are
not entirely independent variables. 50 As the severity of sanc-
tions increases, the certainty of imposition declines to some ex-
tent. At some point (that will vary widely depending on the
circumstances) the effect of the decline in certainty on the cal-
culation of ex ante interest will exceed the effect of the increase
in severity, in which case increasing severity actually reduces
effective deterrence.5 This problem together with the costs of
overenforcement give rise to the need to place some general
limit on the use of legal sanctions to solve the interest problem.
There is a second important problem of interest that is also
generally ignored in academic discussions. Just as we cannot
assume that Ann and Ben want only to be good, it is naive and
50. See Pursuing Justice, supra note 4, at 63-64.
51. This analysis suggests that the problem of interest may best be approached by
efforts to increase the efficiency of law enforcement techniques so as to increase the
certainty of sanctions. A substantial improvement in this area may require fundamental
rethinking of how we provide law enforcement. In particular it may require a shift away
from "public" or monopoly provision to "private" or competitive provision. See Crime
Prevention, supra note 48. The constant agitation to increase deterrence by increasing
the severity of sanctions may best be viewed as an easy way to evade the real institu-
tional responsibility for the inefficient monopoly law enforcement mechanisms that un-
dermine the certainty of imposing sanctions-both civil and criminal.
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dangerous to assume that third parties empowered to adjudi-
cate and intervene in disputes want only to do good. Third par-
ties are subject not only to the problem of knowledge, but also
to the problem of interest. They may see it in their interest at
times to help the rights violator against a genuine victim. Once
empowered to help victims, they are also able to use these same
powers to help themselves. Thus arises the age-old problem of
"who guards the guardians?"
Placing in the hands of some the power to impose sanctions
on others creates a potent problem of interest that becomes a
cause of rather than a cure for injustice. Making the powers to
impose sanctions unlimited by any publicly known precepts
greatly exacerbates this serious problem. Consequently, it be-
comes necessary to subject the imposition of sanctions to prin-
ciples of justice and to the rule of law. This most serious
problem of third party interest may make the ex post adjustment
of legal sanctions to deal with the problem of the interest of
potential rights violators quite impractical. In criminal law ad-
dressing this problem of interest may take the form of determi-
nate as opposed to indeterminate sentencing. In civil law it may
take the form of proportional caps on monetary awards for in-
tangible harms and for punitive damages.
Finally, it is commonly accepted that the power to impose
legal sanctions should be placed in the care of a legal system
that is a legal monopoly. Such a strategy- whether or not it
includes enhanced sanctions-further exacerbates the problem
of interest by eliminating or greatly weakening any effective in-
stitutional constraints on the exercise of such power.
5 2
3. Power and the Requirement of Moral Justification
There is another dimension to using legal means in pursuit
of social ends including solving the social problems of knowl-
edge and interest. This dimension is a moral one. Law neces-
sarily involves the use of force or power against an individual
or group.53 For this reason the use of legal means requires a
different order ofjustification than purely social mechanisms. 54
52. See Pursuing Justice, supra note 4, at 50-56.
53. See Nance, Legal Theory and the Pivotal Role of the Concept of Coercion, 57 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1 (1985) (coercion is an essential aspect of legal mechanisms that jurisprudential
theories must take into account).
54. Cf. R. DWORKIN, supra note 16, at 108-09 ("legal argument takes place on a pla-
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Much of what we think of as a moral justification of coercion
may simply be a tacit cultural distillation of something like the
above analysis of knowledge, interest, and power. Even were
this true, however, the moral sentiment underlying a require-
ment of justification would still be significant. For this senti-
ment ever reminds us that only certain means are permissible
in solving even the most basic of social problems. The preser-
vation of the individual's pursuit of happiness in a social con-
text is the problem that justice and the rule of law have evolved
to solve. In this light, respect for individual liberty secured by
individual rights-the source of the presumption against physi-
cal coercion and fraud-is to be viewed, not as a bothersome
obstacle to some higher social good, but rather as essential to
achieving in practice a truly common good.
III. CONCLUSION: THE FUSION OF JUSTICE
AND THE RULE OF LAw
Justice and the rule of law doubtlessly perform many impor-
tant social functions. In this Foreword, I have offered the thesis
that these ideas can be understood as the means of coping with,
if not solving, the pervasive social problems of knowledge, in-
terest, and power. Individual "entitlements"-substantively
justified rights claims having the appropriate form-provide
cognizable areas where individual discretion can be exercised
free of outside interference. Entitlements also provide bounda-
ries beyond which individual discretion cannot be permitted.
Liberty is not license; it is defined by entitlements that are
based on the fusion ofjustice and the rule of law.
Apart from permitting discretion in the pursuit of happiness,
the clear entitlements that result from the fusion ofjustice and
the rule of law serve a number of important functions. They
give rise to expectations that may be relied upon, permitting
productive investment. They provide third parties a way of
avoiding needless and destructive conflict and a means of dis-
tinguishing victims from aggressors. In this way they serve to
increase the costs of aggression and so diminish its likelihood.
So conceived, entitlements also serve as a benchmark by which
to assess whether law enforcement agencies are staying within
teau of rough consensus that if law exists it provides ajustification for the use of collec-
tive power against individual citizens or groups").
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their bounds. They provides formal safeguards against the un-
due influence of interest and against abuses of power.
The rule of law is neither form for form's sake, nor a second-
best approximation of true justice. Rather, the rule of law is
what makes possible the knowledge and enforcement ofjustice
in a social setting. Of course, as with any evolving concept or
institution, both justice and the rule of law have evolved imper-
fectly. By understanding the social functions these institutions
perform, we may better understand and reform both ideas. As
important as reform, however, is the preservation of sufficient
respect for both of these institutions to avoid unnecessary and
potentially disastrous experimentation. Understanding the so-
cial problems addressed by justice and the rule of law helps us
resist extremists of both the left and right who would deprecate
one value in pursuit of the other. According to the thesis
presented here, we need not try a society based upon justice
without the rule of law or upon the rule of law without justice
to know that either would be a nightmare-and why.
IV. THE IHS SYMPOSIUM ON LAW AND PHILOSOPHY
This is the fourth annual Symposium on Law and Philosophy
sponsored by the Institute for Humane Studies at George Ma-
son University. This symposium issue features two engaging
papers awarded IHS Lon L. Fuller Prizes in Jurisprudence: Jer-
emy Waldron's "When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need
for Rights," and Peter Aranson's "Bruno Leoni in Retrospect."
Gary Lawson's "The Ethics of Insider Trading" was supported
by an IHS Law and Philosophy Fellowship. We are very fortu-
nate as well to have insightful commentary on these papers by
Jules Coleman, by Leonard Liggio and Tom Palmer, and by
Jonathan Macey. Finally, David Thomasson's "Rights, Justice
and Discrimination" was a product of an IHS Leonard P. Cas-
sidy Summer Research Fellowship in Law and Philosophy.
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